My Take 5 (Edition 29): The week that was in international affairs

Welcome back to another edition of My Take 5. Sinwar’s dead in Gaza, Jaishankar made a rare trip to Pakistan, New Delhi has announced a ‘patrolling agreement’ with Beijing, Muizzu’s done a 180 and Bangladesh appears to be erasing symbols of its Liberation Struggle. So let’s get to it:

Sinwar dead: In a blow for Hamas, Israeli soldiers killed Yahya Sinwar , Hamas’s head in Gaza, in what was reportedly a chance encounter. Sinwar had eluded Israeli forces since the latest round of conflict in Gaza began a year ago. He used the vast network of tunnels under Gaza to evade capture and command Hamas troops fighting the IDF. An uncompromising hardliner, Sinwar was also held responsible for the October 7 attack by Hamas that killed 1,200 Israelis and led to the capture of 250 hostages. But it is unclear if Sinwar’s death will end the conflict any time soon. Given the relentless bombardment of Gaza by Israel, Hamas’s fighting capacity has indeed degraded. But the death and destruction have only bolstered Hamas’s legitimacy among Palestinians as the only Palestinian force capable of standing up to Israel.

In other words, Israel’s heavy military campaign has ensured that the next generation of Hamas leaders will replace Sinwar. And as long as external actors – read Iran and others backing the Palestinian resistance for their own strategic agenda – support Hamas materially, the outfit will continue to survive. Only the implementation of a Two State Solution can potentially end this conflict. But with those both in Israel and on the Palestinian side against this, the conflict will continue and Palestinians will suffer. Sinwar’s death is unlikely to change that reality.

Jaishankar in Pakistan: External affairs minister S Jaishankar’s visit to Pakistan – the first in almost nine years – for the SCO summit was significant despite there being no official bilateral meetings between the two sides. Nonetheless, there were ‘unofficial chats’ on the sidelines of the summit which are being interpreted as ‘ice-breakers’. Which is good because this is precisely the moment that India can think about reinitiating a Pakistan engagement. Pakistan today has multiple problems, from economic woes to security challenges. Plus, those forces in Pakistan that are obsessed with anti-India activities have been stymied to a great degree on three counts – India’s revocation of special status for its Jammu & Kashmir, New Delhi building significant ties with Middle East players who previously bankrolled Islamabad, and the US no longer seeing Pakistan as a vital strategic asset.

Therefore, Pakistan’s weakened position is exactly what gives the possible resumption of bilateral engagement with India a chance. Plus, it’s also a fact that Pakistani polity is witnessing a generational shift with the post-1971 generation coming to the fore. This presents India with an opportunity to engage those Pakistani politicians with whom it can work out a modus vivendi for peace in South Asia. Pakistan is not a monolith. And yes, despite being weakened, there are still forces in that country that are committed to ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’. They may be emboldened with recent developments in Bangladesh. So it’s in India’s interest to explore the possibility of a cautious engagement with the right actors in Pakistan. Of course, Islamabad has to abjure terrorism as an instrument of state policy first. Both sides going back to the 1999 Lahore Declaration may be a litmus test.

Thaw in India-China ties?: India and China have reportedly worked out a ‘patrolling agreement’ that could be a pre-cursor to disengagement along the LAC. The contours of the patrolling pact are yet not clear. But it sets the stage for a potential Modi-Xi pull aside on the sidelines of the Brics summit in Russia.

However, it remains to be seen how this plays out on the ground. With 50,000 troops from each side ranged against each other for the fifth consecutive winter, a thaw would be welcome. But given China’s expansionist tendency under Xi, can Beijing be really trusted? It’s clear that China doesn’t see India as an equal. And it uses the border issue for its own internal politics. Therefore, Beijing can make the border hot or cold as and when it suits them. One key objective that China has is to ensure that the Quad grouping does not reach its full potential. Towards that end, it would want to throw India a bone now and then to prevent total tilt towards the West. This strategy also helps counter the growing narrative that India should wind down ties with Russia because of the China-Russia limitless compact. India, of course, would like to retain its strategic autonomy. But can it really take Beijing at its word? Does it really believe that Beijing will not do another Galwan after having pushed the LAC westward? As the American saying goes: Trust but verify.

India-Maldives reboot ties: Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu’s recent India visit saw New Delhi and Male practically reset their relationship. In a 180-degree turn, Muizzu not only secured fresh financial support from India but also appealed to Indian tourists to return to the Maldives . This is a far cry from the situation earlier this year when ties between the two countries had hit a low point. Muizzu had just come to power on an ‘India Out’ campaign, had asked New Delhi to withdraw its small contingent of troops stationed in the archipelago nation, undertook a state visit to China and inked a defence pact with Beijing. Signs were that Muizzu was placing the Maldives firmly in Beijing’s orbit.

But India played smart, withdrew its troops from the Maldives and replaced them with civilians, and provided much-needed budgetary support to Male. This, and the realisation that India will remain the Maldives’s largest Indian Ocean neighbour, seems to have changed Muizzu’s mind. This is a victory for New Delhi which needs Male to maintain its strategic depth in the Indian Ocean region, especially in the context of Beijing’s growing naval presence here. Improving India-Maldives relations also shores up New Delhi’s neighbourhood policy which had received a setback following developments in Bangladesh.

Bangladesh’s radical turn?: Bangladesh is cancelling several national holidays linked to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman . The decision was apparently taken by the council of advisers of the interim govt led by Muhammad Yunus. The holidays axed include March 7 – when Mujib gave his iconic speech calling for independence from Pakistan – and August 15 – marking Bangabandhu’s assassination. This is being interpreted as advancing a Pakistani ideology that refutes Bangladesh’s Liberation movement. There’s no denying that Sheikh Hasina’s ouster has galvanised forces that either never fully accepted Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan or did not subscribe to the Awami League’s interpretation of the liberation struggle.

This in turn may have created an opening for pro-Pakistan elements in Bangladesh, which is a problem for India. In fact, if Bangladesh goes on to become a Pakistan twin, it will undo all the progress that New Delhi-Dhaka bilateral ties have seen over the last 15 years. The issue is those who are in charge in Bangladesh today associate India solely with the Hasina regime. It is New Delhi’s failure to dispel this perception over the last 15 years that has led us to this pass. New Delhi has to now work extra hard to regain the momentum with Dhaka.